Efficient Heralding of Photonic Qubits with Apllications to Device
  Independent Quantum Key Distribution by Pitkänen, David et al.
Efficient Heralding of Photonic Qubits with Applications to Device Independent
Quantum Key Distribution
David Pitkanen1, Xiongfeng Ma1, Ricardo Wickert2, Peter van Loock2, Norbert Lu¨tkenhaus1
1Institute for Quantum Computing & Department of Physics and Astronomy,
University of Waterloo, 200 University Avenue West, N2L 3G1 Waterloo, Ontario, Canada and
2Max Planck Institute for the Science of Light and Universita¨t Erlangen-Nu¨rnberg, 91058 Erlangen, Germany
(Dated: October 25, 2018)
We present an efficient way of heralding photonic qubit signals using linear optics devices. First we
show that one can obtain asymptotically perfect heralding and unit success probability with growing
resources. Second, we show that even using finite resources, we can improve qualitatively and
quantitatively over earlier heralding results. In the latte r scenario, we can obtain perfect heralded
photonic qubits while maintaining a finite success probability. We demonstrate the advantage of our
heralding scheme by predicting key rates for device independent quantum key distribution, taking
imperfections of sources and detectors into account.
I. INTRODUCTION
Applications such as the verification of entanglement
for quantum communication, and the establishment of
security proofs in Device Independent Quantum Key Dis-
tribution (DIQKD) [1] have generated increasing interest
in violations of Bell’s inequalities over long distances. A
violation of Bell’s inequality is supposed to be a test for
a non-local correlation between the outcomes of pairs of
events; however, it is difficult to design an experiment
that rigorously shows this non-locality, as imperfections
in the experimental equipment can open loopholes which
allow for a local Hidden Variable (HV) explanation of the
measured data. For example, signal loss in optical im-
plementations generates the so-called detection efficiency
loophole [2].
In experiments, with growing distance the transmission
loss increases. Consequently, the resulting low total de-
tection probabilities make violations of Bell’s inequality
virtually impossible. To overcome this issue, the use of
heralding devices [3, 4] has been suggested. Such an ap-
paratus performs a measurement that ressembles a quan-
tum non-demolition (QND) measurement, raising a flag
to indicate whenever the desired signal successfully tra-
versed the channel. The state generated by conditioning
on this flag can then be employed in a Bell test. This
procedure does not lead to a detection loophole as long
as the flagging is independent of the measurement choice.
Gisin et al. [4] have considered an implementation of a
heralding device in a DIQKD scheme employing realistic
sources, linear optical components and photon-number
resolving detectors. The proposed scheme uses the trans-
missivity of one of its beam splitters as an adjustable pa-
rameter to regulate the ratio between vacuum and single
photons in the conditional output state at the expense of
the probability of successful heralding. With input sig-
nals consisting only of vacuum and single-photon states,
increasing the single-photon component to unity in the
conditional state can only be achieved in the limit of
vanishing success probability. If the input also contains
multiphoton signals, then the fraction of single photon
signals in the conditional states cannot reach unity.
In the present work we investigate improvements on
this scheme to overcome its limitations. We begin by
reviewing the known results on heralding in Section II.
Then in Section III, we investigate fundamental limits
with unlimited resources, staying within the linear op-
tics toolbox. In this regime, we can employ large ancilla
states to realize a KLM-like teleportation procedure [5]
and demonstrate that we can perform the desired QND
measurement perfectly, although non-deteministically.
Shifting our focus to practical schemes that allow only
limited resources, we then revisit in Section IV the orig-
inal proposal. Motivated by our general scheme and the
Hong-Ou-Mandel effect [6], we suggest a modification
that significantly improves the heralding device. The
modification is done by adding two beamsplitters to the
initial linear optics circuit while maintaining the original
simple ancillae states.
Since the original amplifier was proposed for use in
DIQKD, we analyze the performance of our amplifier in
Section V and demonstrate that the improvement of the
heralding device translates into an enhanced key rate.
II. PHOTONIC AND QUBIT AMPLIFIER
We begin by revisiting the noiseless linear photonic
amplifier proposal of Ralph and Lund [3], see Fig. 1. A
single-photon ancilla state passes through a beam split-
ter of transmissivity t to create an entangled state of two
modes involving vacuum and single photons. One of the
modes will be the output of the device, while the other is
mixed with the input mode, ρin, on a 50:50 beam split-
ter. Both output modes of the 50 : 50 beam splitter are
measured on photon detectors and the observation of ex-
actly one photon in the measured modes is taken as the
successful heralding flag.
Depending which of the two detectors is triggering the
flag, an optical phase correction has to be applied at the
output of the device. This feed-forward mechanism is
not essential to our discussions, and we incorporate it
directly into the description of the device. In practise
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FIG. 1: (a) The Ralph-Lund noiseless linear amplifier
scheme: an input mode ρin interacts with an ancilla state
through a 50 : 50 beam splitter. Conditioned on a successful
detection pattern, which raises the heralding flag, the out-
put ρout is shifted towards the single-photon state. The pa-
rameter t is the transmissivity of the beamsplitter (b) The
Gisin-Pironio-Sangouard qubit heralding device: two ampli-
fiers are combined to amplify states in the horizontal/vertical
(h/v) basis; the flag is only raised if both of the amplifiers are
successful. The input state ρin, encoded in the polarisation
basis h/v, is sent through a polarising beamsplitter (PBS) to
spatially separate its modes so that the different amplifiers
may be applied. A second PBS is used to combine the differ-
ent spatial modes of the output into the h/v basis. In both
schemes the feed-forward mechanism has been omitted.
one will have to do this feed-forward, unless the action
of the phase correction can be combined with a subse-
quent measurement in such a way that, instead of active
feed-forward, just a re-interpretation of the measurement
results takes place.
For t = 12 , this scheme amounts to standard proba-
bilistic quantum teleportation; however, for t > 12 , the
vacuum component |0〉 of the outgoing mode ρout is re-
duced and the single-photon term |1〉 emerges enhanced
relative to the vacuum component. This corresponds to
a mapping induced by a Kraus operator A,
A (c0|0〉+ c1|1〉) =
√
1− tc0|0〉+
√
tc1|1〉 , (1)
which has the important property that, as t→ 1, this cir-
cuit approaches a projection onto the single photon state,
|1〉. We use non-normalized states in our description, so
that the success probability of the heralding device is
given by the norm of the conditional output state and it
is naturally dependent of the input state.
The two-dimensional Hilbert space of exactly one ex-
citation in two optical modes is known as a photonic or
dual-rail qubit [7]. It is the central idea of the work
by Gisin et al. [4] to use two Ralph-Lund amplifiers [3]
in parallel on the two modes to herald such a photonic
qubit. A successfully heralded event is defined as the
joint success of both amplifiers. The action is then rep-
resented as
A⊗A (c00|00〉+ c10|10〉+ c01|01〉) =
(1− t)c00|00〉+
√
t(1− t) (c10|10〉+ c01|01〉) . (2)
The circuit for this qubit amplifier is shown in Fig. 1,
where the dual-rail qubit is encoded in the polarization.
The weight of the dual-rail qubit component in this con-
ditional state can reach unity in the limit t → 1. In
this limit the probability of successful heralding vanishes,
indepedendently of the input state. If the input state
also contains a multiphoton component, c11|11〉, then the
weight of the dual-rail qubit in the output state can no
longer reach unity, as the output will also contain the
component tc11|11〉. In that case, the choice t1−t = |c00||c11|
optimizes the qubit fraction of the output. This optimal
qubit fraction in the heralded signals is then given by
|c10|2 + |c01|2
2|c11||c00|+ |c10|2 + |c01|2 . (3)
Although we have only considered the case of a pure
state input, this bound also applies to mixed states if√〈ij|ρin|ij〉 is used instead of |cij |.
III. KLM PROCEDURE
Before proposing a scheme to overcome the limitations
of the heralding setup by Gisin et al., let us take a more
fundamental point of view. We remain restricted to the
linear optics toolbox, but allow for the use of more com-
plicated sources for the ancilla states, and show that,
in this context, the heralding measurement for dual-
rail qubits can be performed asymptotically perfectly.
Our approach is based on the KLM framework [5] and
the procedure introduced therein, which successfully ac-
complishes the teleportation of an arbitrary state of the
form c0|0〉+ c1|1〉 with a probability that can be brought
asymptotically close to 1.
The implementation of such procedure relies on the use
of an ancilla state
|tn〉 = 1√
n+ 1
n∑
i=0
|sn,i〉 , (4)
where |sn,i〉 = |1〉i|0〉n−i|0〉i|1〉n−i. Here the notation |1〉i
refers to the i-fold tensor product |1〉⊗i. We refer to the
first n modes of this state as the teleporting modes, while
the second n modes are referred to as output modes. In
order to perform the teleportation, a (n+1)-mode Fourier
transform is performed on the teleporting modes of the
ancilla |tn〉 and the input, followed by a photon-counting
measurement on these modes. The Fourier transform is
responsible for making the result of the photon measure-
ments indistinguishable independently of which modes
the photons have originated from. As a result, if k
photons are detected, the remaining unmeasured output
modes are left in the state
c0|0〉k|1〉n−k + e−iφkc1|0〉k−1|1〉n−k+1 . (5)
The phase φk depends on the number of counted photons,
k, and the observed detection pattern, and can be cor-
rected with an appropriately adjusted phase shifter. As
3in the case of the linear photonic amplifier, we will incor-
porate this correction automatically into our description.
Overall, the input state will then be found in the k-th
mode of the above state.
This approach can also be adapted to perform a non-
demolition measurement onto the single-photon input
space of two modes. To do this, we will consider the
auxiliary state
|t˜n〉 = 1√
n+ 1
n∑
i=0
|sn,i〉|sn,n−i〉 , (6)
which corresponds to those terms in |tn〉⊗|tn〉 containing
exactly n photons in the two sets of teleporting modes
in the |sn,i〉 states. We now show that the application
of the KLM-type procedure, employing the alternative
state above, realizes a QND measurement onto the total
photon-number space of the input modes. To verify this,
we first note that this procedure effectively measures the
photon number in the input: as the total number of pho-
tons in the two pairs of teleporting auxilliary modes is
known to be n, the observed photon number on the in-
put and these 2n modes tells us how many photons have
entered the heralding device. In a second step, we need
to verify that the output state corresponds to that of
a QND measurement: if the two Fourier measurements
acting each on one input mode and one set of teleporting
modes yield the observation of i and n − i + 1 photons
respectively, giving exactly n + 1 photons in total, and
these individual photon numbers are neither 0 or n + 1,
then the corresponding conditional state of the remaining
2n output modes is
c01|0〉i|1〉n−i|0〉n−i|1〉i + c10|0〉i−1|1〉n−i+1|0〉n−i+1|1〉i−1 .
(7)
This means that the input state has been teleported into
the mode pair with indices (i, 2n − i + 1) of the above
state. The probability of failure of this scheme, just as in
the original KLM proposal, is connected to occurence of 0
or n+1 photons in the individual Fourier measurements,
and is given by 1n+1 . Thus, one can (asymptotically) not
only perform a perfect heralding measurement, i.e., ap-
proaching the idealized QND measurement in the desired
single-excitation subspace, but also have the probability
of success be made arbitrarily close to unity.
IV. MODIFIED AMPLIFIER CIRCUIT
An obvious strength of the scheme proposed in [4] lies
in the relative simplicity of its ancilla states, which can
be generated with a single-photon source and vacuum
states. Here we take a practical approach, keeping the
same ancilla states, and look for simple modifications we
can make to the amplifier to improve its performance.
We focus on modifying the amplifier so that a vacuum
input will no longer trigger the heralding flag at all. We
begin by examining the original scheme, which consists
of two separate Ralph-Lund amplifiers, each with their
own auxilliary single photon states.
In order for the signal to be heralded by the qubit
amplifier, both of the flags on the separate Ralph-Lund
amplifiers need to be raised by detecting exactly one pho-
ton respectively, after each of the 50:50 beam splitters.
This set-up can lead to false flagging for a vacuum input.
These false heralding flags occur if both of the auxiliary
photons from the separate amplifiers travel ’upwards’ in
our diagram towards the heralding detectors behind the
50:50 beamsplitters.
We suppress this component by adding another 50:50
beamsplitter between these upward directed modes; the
Hong-Ou-Mandel effect [6] ensures that the component
with two photons in each mode will now bunch to either
of the outgoing modes of the beamsplitter. This means
that the heralding detectors of one of the Ralph-Lund
amplifiers will see zero photons, while the other will see
two, and therefore, the heralding condition of the qubit
amplifier will no longer be met. A second 50:50 beam-
splitter is added to the output modes of the qubit ampli-
fier, so that the transformation effected by the amplifier
to the single-photon input does not change. On the other
hand, the action of the second beamsplitter corresponds
to a change of polarization basis on the single-photon
subspace, and can be absorbed into the action of any
device that is acting on the output of the heralding de-
vice. With these two additional beamsplitters (see Fig.
2), we find that the successful heralding is connected to
the Kraus operator Amod given by
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FIG. 2: The proposed circuit for the improved qubit ampli-
fier. Without the two 50 : 50 beamsplitters, marked B1 and
B2, it corresponds exactly to exactly the amplifier suggested
by Gisin et al. The circuit’s inputs are the two modes of ρin.
The amplifier is only meant to output a signal, ρout, when a
single photon is measured in each of the detector sets (d1, d2)
and (d3, d4). The required feed-forward mechanism to correct
optical phases is omitted.
Amod (c00|00〉+ c10|10〉+ c01|01〉+ c11|11〉) (8)
=
√
t(1− t) (c01|01〉+ c10|10〉) + t 1√
2
c11 (|20〉+ |02〉) .
4This Kraus operator already accounts for the required
phase correction that depends on the exact pattern of
single-photon detection after each of the two 50:50 be-
ramsplitters.
The transformation overcomes both problems that
were discussed in the previous section: first, assuming
only vacuum and single photon input signals (c11 = 0),
this amplifier can perform a perfect, heralded projection
onto the dual-rail component. Second, even if multiple
photons are present in the input (c11 6= 0), the single-
photon fraction in the output can still be made arbitrarily
close to unity in the limit of vanishing success probability
(t −→ 0) .
V. APPLICATION TO DEVICE INDEPENDENT
QKD
The security of Device Independent QKD (DIQKD) is
based on a set of assumptions that is reduced compared
to that of traditional QKD; the most remarkable differ-
ence being that for DIQKD the communicating users of
an entanglement-based scheme can be ignorant of the
precise characterization of their measuring devices with-
out compromising the security of the protocol. The pri-
vacy of the resulting key depends on the users being able
to perform measurements that violate Bell’s inequality.
This approach first appeared with EPR based QKD [8].
Related work has been done under the headline of self-
testing devices [9–11]. Here we refer to the formulation
by Acin et al. [12].
To bound information of an eavesdropper in DIQKD,
Alice and Bob both randomly and independently select
two measurements which are designed to verify the vio-
lation of Bell’s inequality by evaluating a Bell parameter
S. To generate the key, the receiver also makes use of
a third measurement, σz, which is designed to obtain
highly correlated data with the sender. These data serve
as the raw key from which the final key will be distilled.
On these data, we expect to find binary error rates Q.
In the proposal for the original qubit heralding device,
a DIQKD simulation was performed to demonstrate how
heralding overcomes transmission losses. The simulation
included imperfect sources and detectors. We perform
analogous simulations to demonstrate the improvement
that our heralding device offers. For this comparison,
we consider three main scenarios. The first one is moti-
vated by the simulation reported in Gisin et al. [4], where
the authors introduced a theoretical framework to deal
with inconclusive outputs due to imperfect devices. In
this framework restrictions on the eavesdropping strate-
gies are assumed; we therefore refer to this framework in
our simulations as Restricted Device Independent The-
ory, in subsection V A 1. In addition we also run simu-
lations which deal with the inconclusive results by ran-
domly assigning them a conclusive binary value, thereby
allowing us to apply the usual Unrestricted Device Inde-
pendent Theory, in subsection V A 2. As a third frame-
work, we explore the so-called Detection Device Indepen-
dent Theory, in subsection V A 3, where knowledge of the
source is assumed, but one can remain ignorant about the
measurement device of one of the parties. The assumed
knowledge of the source, in this framework, makes it use-
ful not only for entanglement-based setups, but also for
prepare-and-measure schemes.
A. Experimental Setup
We now describe the proposed experimental setup
for DIQKD. To mediate the communication, a sponta-
neous Parametric Down-conversion Source (EPR-SPDC)
is used which generates entangled photons. The (unnor-
malized) state obtained through this process is given by
ρsource = |0〉〈0|+ p|φ+〉〈φ+|+ p2|φ+2〉〈φ+2|+O(p3) ,
(9)
where |φ+〉 is an EPR pair, |1010〉+ |0101〉; and |φ+2〉 =
|2020〉+ |1111〉+ |0202〉, up to a normalization. The pa-
rameter p is related to the pumping power. This EPR-
SPDC source is located near one of the parties, Alice, and
the two-mode signal that is received by the more distant
party, Bob, is subject to transmission loss ηt. The loss
which results from using imperfect detectors and cou-
pling into fibers is taken into account with efficiency pa-
rameters ηd and ηc respectively. In our simulations we
assume that all the detectors have the same efficiency so
we model the detectors as perfect and include the de-
tector loss in the coupling efficiency ηcd = ηcηd. The
photons employed in the auxilliary states of the ampli-
fiers are generated from a heralded SPDC process that
outputs the state [13]
ρaux = p
′ηcd|1〉〈1|+ 2(1− ηcd)ηcdp′2|2〉〈2|+
3(1− ηcd)2ηcdp′3|3〉〈3|+O(p4) , (10)
where p′ is again the pumping power. The amplifier
therefore acts on the state
ρtotal = ρsource ⊗ ρ⊗2aux ⊗ |0〉〈0|⊗2 (11)
which incluces both components of the source states: the
one that remains at Alice’s site, and that which enters
the amplifier. The whole set-up is depicted in Fig. 3 to
indicate where coupling and detection efficiencies are in-
cluded. Note that we include coupling efficiencies for the
heralding detectors . Omitting these reproduces for the
original heralding device exacltly the simulation shown
in [4]. The source is on Alice’s side of the set-up. There-
fore, transmission loss affects only the signal travelling
from the source to the amplifier, which is located in Bob’s
site.
For simulation purposes, we follow the choices made in
[4] and assume a repetition rate of 10 GHz. In order to
maximize the key rate, an optimization is performed over
the pump parameter p and over the transmissivity t of the
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FIG. 3: Experimental setup for the amplifier in the DIQKD simulations we consider. An EPR SPDC source is used to generate
photons that are sent to the two distant parties. Two additional SPDC sources are used as heralded single photon sources for
the amplifier. Each wire in this diagram represents a separate optical mode — ie. we use two wires to represent a single spatial
mode if we are using both of the polarisation, horizontal/vertical (h/v), degrees of freedom. The signal recieved by Bob is only
processed if the right detection pattern appears on the amplifier.
beamsplitter used in the heralding device. The range of
the parameters p and p′ are restricted to 0 ≤ p, p′ ≤ 10−2,
as we use a perturbative approach in our simulations.
This constraint, however, affects only the simulations of
the Detection Device Independent Scenario.
The detectors in the heralding schemes are modelled
as photon-number resolving detectors. Transition-edge
superconducting detectors can be used for this purpose.
Alternatively, a cascade of beamsplitters followed by
threshold photon counters can approximate such photon-
number resolving detectors.
Our calculations do not include dark counts. For this
to be a valid assumption, we will require that the total
dark count rate is negligibe compared to the total rate
of heralded events. Superconducting nanowire single-
photon detectors have been demonstrated to be able to
work in this regime [14].
Our simulations are done as perturbative approxima-
tions in the pump parameters p and p′. To bound the
error in this approximation, we also provide lower bounds
on the expected key rates by calculating the total weight
of the neglected terms, and by using this weight in inde-
pendent worst case values for the Bell parameters S and
quantum bit error rates Q.
1. Restricted Device Independent Theory
The framework proposed by Gisin et al. follows the
standard device independent protocol [15], but augments
it by an analysis which makes an additional assumption
about the eavesdropping strategies. Thanks to this as-
sumption, all of the inconclusive results can be discarded
during post-processing, though the rate of inconclusive
results affects the resulting key rate. The key rate, which
is given by
K ≥ µcc
{
1− h[Qcc] (12)
−
[(
1− µc
µcc
)
χ
[
µccScc − 4µc
µcc + µc
]
+
µc
µcc
]}
,
with
h[x] = −x log2[x]− (1− x) log2 [1− x] and (13)
χ[x] = h
[
1 +
√
(x/2)2 − 1
2
]
. (14)
Here, µcc is the probability that both parties obtain a
conclusive result. Within this set of conclusive data, Scc
is the measured Bell parameter, and Qcc is the error rate.
The probability that only one of the parties obtains a
conclusive result is denoted by µc. The results are shown
in Fig. 4. We find that our heralding device improves
the distance and rate significantly.
2. Unrestricted Device Independent Theory
The scheme utilizing the unrestricted device indepen-
dent theory differs solely from the setting in the previous
section in its data post-processing stage. Any inconclu-
sive measurement result on either side has binary out-
comes assigned at random. Knowledge of the placements
of such inconclusive results is later used in the error cor-
rection step [16]. For this reason, the key rate includes
quantities that reflect the fraction of conclusive results.
The resulting key rate is
K = µ−c (1− h[Q−c])− χ[S] . (15)
Here, µ−c is the probability of Bob obtaining a conclusive
result and Q−c is the error rate within Bob’s conclusive
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FIG. 4: Key Rate vs. Distance, plotted for both the origi-
nal [4] and the modified amplifier. The simulations are done
using the Restricted Device Independent Theory framework.
The key rate is calculated from Eqn.(12), multiplied by the
repetition rate of the source and the probability that the am-
plifier successfully heralds the signal. The efficiency param-
eters are chosen as ηd = 0.95 and ηc = 0.90, resulting in an
overall efficiency of ηcd = 0.855.
measurement results. Finally, h[x] and χ[x] are the same
as in Eq.’s (13) and (14). The Bell parameter S is evalu-
ated using the data from all of the measurement results,
including the the random assignments of inconclusive re-
sults.
From Eq.(15), we can see that the parties need non-
classical correlations with S > 2 to generate a positive
key. Therefore, the random assignment puts a constraint
on the probability that a conclusive result is measured
on both sides, µ−c > 1√2 ∼ 0.707. However, if we use a
SPDC source to generate the signals, we find from Eq.
(3) that the qubit fraction after heralding is bounded by
µ−c < 3/5 when using the original heralding device, even
when using ideal detectors and single photon sources.
Therefore, such amplifier cannot be employed to gener-
ate positive key rates in this framework, unless a different
source is used to generate the entangled photons. Note
that other assignments of inconclusive results are possi-
ble [1] which may allow to extract secret key with the
original heralding device. The discussion requires more
detailed analysis, as it depends on the exact configura-
tion of the set-up. It is omitted here, as these studies go
beyond the scope of the current research. However, some
discussion of this question can be found in the work by
Moroder and Curty [17].
Due to the above, the simulations for the unrestricted
device independent theory are performed only for the
newly proposed amplifier (see Fig 6). This framework
is the most demanding on coupling and detection effi-
ciencies that need to be used in order to generate a pos-
itive key: in our simulations, we use a total loss term
ηcd = 0.93.
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FIG. 5: Key Rate vs Distance, plotted on a logarithmic scale
for our proposed amplifier using the Unrestricted Device In-
dependent Theory framework. We calculate the key rate from
Eq. (15), multiplied by the repetition rate of the source, 10
GHz, and the probability that the amplifier successfully her-
alds the signal. The efficiency parameter is ηcd = 0.95.
3. Detector Device Independent Theory
The final framework we consider is not fully device in-
dependent and, as a result, the security does not require
a loophole-free violation of Bell’s inequality. Here, the
standard BB84 protocol is used [18] and we trust the
source on Alice’s side only. Bob’s detectors remain un-
characterized. This scenario has been considered by May-
ers [19], and later also by Koashi. The scenario makes
random assignment of inconclusive results on Bob’s side
necessary and therefore places a constraint on the detec-
tion probability that is required in order to generate a
secure key [16]. Again we use the fact that the position
of events with random assignment are known to Bob,
who can utilize this knowledge in the later error correc-
tion step. The security proof [16] is therefore a variation
of corresponding proofs of Koashi [20]. This scenario is
more tolerant to transmission loss. For example, with
perfect photon pair sources and detection devices, this
scenario tolerates a total efficiency accounting for trans-
mission, coupling and detection loss of 64.5% without
heralding [16]. The key rate this scheme is given by [16]
K ≥ µ−c (1− h[Q−c])− h[δb] . (16)
Here, δb = µ−cQ−c + (1 − µ−c) 12 is an effective phase
error rate; as in Eq.(15), µ−c is the probability of Bob
obtaining a conclusive result, and Q−c is the error rate
when Bob’s measurement is conclusive. This framework
is the least demanding on the the coupling and detector
efficiencies.
The simulations’ results shown in Fig. 6. In this case
the pump parameters are larger compared to the other
two scenarios. Therefore, the gap between the approxi-
mated rates and the lower bounds is more pronounced.
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FIG. 6: Key Rate vs Distance, plotted for both the original
and the modified amplifier using the Detection Device Inde-
pendent Theory framework. We calculate our key rate from
Eq. (16), multiplied by the repetition rate of the source, 10
GHz, and the probability that the amplifier successfully her-
alds the signal. The efficiency parameter is ηcd = 0.75.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Heralding devices can play an important role in quan-
tum key distribution. In principle, they allow to over-
come the limitation posed by transmission losses to de-
vice independent quantum key distribution. In addition,
other areas of quantum communication can benefit from
such heralding devices. For example, some quantum
memory approaches do not provide intrinsic heralding
devices. Using external heralding, as proposed in this
paper, will allow the use of such memories in quantum
repeater technologies [21].
In this regard, we have explored the KLM framework
and employed it in the implementation of a conceptually
optimal heralding strategy which, in the limit of asymp-
totic resources, achieves a perfect QND-like measurement
onto the desired signal subspace with success probability
approaching unity.
Departing from the conceptual scenario, we discussed
a simple and experimentally-viable improvement on the
original work by Gisin et al. [4], enhancing the perfor-
mance of the heralding device. Specifically, we were able
to overcome the undesired relation between how reliably
the device works in heralding its input, and the success
probability of the heralding process. Our device allows,
in an idealistic implementation, perfect operation on the
important input subspace containing at most one pho-
ton in each of the optical modes that define the dual-rail
qubit.
This improvement not only increases the achievable
key rates, in the context of a restricted device indepen-
dent theory, by roughly one order of magnitude in dis-
tance and rate as compared to the scheme in [4], but
also allows us to enter the domain of fully unrestricted
device independent theory. Our simulations show that,
under the similar assumptions as those made in [4], we
can obtain positive key rates in this desirable scenario.
Note, however, that the requirements on detection and
coupling efficiency are more demanding.
Finally, we showed that, for detector device indepen-
dent theories with a well characterized source but unchar-
acterized detection devices, a secret key can be generated
with relaxed requirements on the detection and coupling
efficiencies, pushing these scenarios now into the domain
where experimental realization can be attempted.
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